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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will begin by defining the environmental commons. There is
no canonical definition of the environmental commons but based on
etymological use, and jurisprudential lineage, this Article will offer a
functional definition of environmental commons. The environmental
commons consists of bio-physical phenomena like air, water, land, sea,
atmosphere, and ecosystems which support life on earth. This Article will
then provide examples of environmental commons that could benefit from
judicial protection.
Part III of this Article deals with the legal architecture ofjudicial protection
of the environmental commons which consists of primary rules of law and
secondary rules of state responsibility. This is followed by examining how
judicial intervention has been used to protect the oceanic ommons. The
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analysis uses the lens of three cases involving the environmental commons
including the Nuclear Test Cases I and the South China Sea Arbitration.2
Part IV of this Article addresses numerous challenges confronting judicial
protection of the environmental commons. The Article concludes by
reviewing the promise of judicial protection and the principal weaknesses in
international adjudication. The promise offered by primary rules of law
pertaining to the oceanic commons i countered by secondary rules of state
responsibility dealing with attribution, and the enforcement of judgments.
Part V of this Article makes limited suggestions for overcoming some of
these weaknesses.
II. DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS
We are dealing with the conjunction of two terms: "environment" and
"commons." Etymologically, "environment" is derived from the French
words environ or environner which means around, roundabout, to surround,
to encompass.3 In turn, environ is derived from the Old French virer or viron
which means a circle, around, the country around, or circuit.4 Even this
blushing etymological encounter with the word environment suggests that it
relates in some way to the totality, and everything that encompasses each and
every human and human society. Moreover, it is possible to infer an
interaction or symbiosis between humans and the environment. The
environment is a living identity, not an inert phenomenon, that responds to
human activity that might affect it.
5
The idea of the commons traces its legal lineage to the Roman Law concept
of res communis, succinctly codified in the Institutes of Justinian.
6
According to the Institutes ome "things" are defined by the law of nature as
common to mankind. They include "the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea.",7 But to many unfamiliar with Justinian,
the term "commons" is perceived as originating from the traditional English
legal term for common land (commons) popularized as a shared resource by
1 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457 (Dec. 20).
2 See In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
3 LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 221 (1994); ENVIRONMENTAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 467 (Marci Bortman et al. eds., 3d ed.
2003).
4 ENVIRONMENTAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 3.
5 Gerald L. Young, Environment: Term and Concept in the Social Sciences, 25 SoC. SCI.
INF. 83, 83-84 (1986).
6 J. INST. 2.1.1.
7 Id.
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Garrett Hardin in his famous 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons." As
Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom have observed: "Prior to the
publication of Hardin's article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles
containing the words 'the commons,' 'common pool resources,' or 'common
property' were very rare in the academic literature." 9
It is possible to weave the meanings of environment with commons, to
arrive at a functional definition that does not encompass the intellectual or
cultural environment. Accordingly, the environmental commons could be
defined as consisting of bio-physical phenomena like air, water, land, sea,
atmosphere, and ecosystems which support life on earth.
A. Examples of the Environmental Commons
Using the suggested functional definition of environmental commons, it is
possible to offer examples of environmental commons that could benefit
from judicial protection. Here are the most prominent among them:
I. The atmosphere which mediates climate and life on earth is a leading
example of an environmental commons. If the accumulation of
greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is leading to
apocalyptic changes, then the atmosphere is an environmental commons
calling for remedial management or regulation.
2. Population growth leading to overpopulation. This was one of the
primary concerns of Hardin, and remains a problem of the commons. 10
8 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
Frank van Laerhoven & Elinor Ostrom, Traditions and Trends in the Study of the
Commons, 1 INT'L J. COMMONS 3, 5 (2007).
10 Hardin, writing in 1968, cited Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of
Population (1798), in which Malthus discussed the problem of food production and population
growth. Malthus argued that people reproduce faster than food can be produced, and inevitably
a population will run out of food if it continues to grow at a steady rate. According to Hardin,
if population continues to grow at the present alarming rates, the earth's resources, which are
finite, will quickly be exhausted, and become unable to support the earth's population.
However, Malthus and Hardin, underestimated the role of technology, and the world has not
run out of food. In fact, the world produces more than enough food to feed the total world
population today. The real problem is one of distribution. The surplus food produced in rich
developed countries is not distributed to the poor needy countries. The result is that the world
faces three interwoven and intractable issues. First, the reality of poverty and famine
especially in poor less developed countries across the globe. Second, increasing population
in these countries which Unfortunately, are unable to properly feed, house or clothe their
increasing population. Third, the absence of a treaty ordering re-distribution of food,
embodying primary rules of the kind described below, which could be upheld through
compulsory adjudication. In the absence of a treaty and compulsory adjudication, there is
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3. Air pollution caused by chemicals other than carbon dioxide. These can
consist of toxic heavy metals like mercury or cadmium, or harmful
ubiquitous pollutants like nitrogen oxides or sulfur dioxides, that can
harm human health, damage ecosystems, and interfere with amenities.
4. Water pollution and exhaustion of ground water by over irrigation is
another example of the possible tragedy of the commons.
5. Oceanic pollution remains a concern and the damage to the oceans could
lead to another tragedy of the commons.
6. The destruction of rain forests, coral reefs, and mangrove swamps that
contain the highest remaining concentrations of biological diversity in
the form of fauna and or flora, can irrevocably damage the ecology of
life that supports human societies. This may take the form of:
a. Logging of rain forests and slash and burn methods of forest
clearance;
b. Destruction of coral reefs by chemical pollution, dynamiting for
fish, and industrial harvesting of coral reefs of the kind referred
to in the South China Sea Arbitration discussed below; and
c. "Reclaiming" of the ocean by harvesting for coral and other
biota for the purpose of building on rock and other formations
in the sea, of the kind referred to in the South China Sea
Arbitration. This is different from the development of coastal
areas covered by mangrove swamps for purposes of coastal
zone development, that leads to the disappearance of such
swamps.
7. Overfishing can destroy fish stocks that provide up to 20% of the world's
protein. 11
III. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS
There are three pre-conditions for judicial intervention to protect the
environmental commons. The first consists of primary rules of obligation
creating or protecting the environmental commons. The second consists of
the existence of secondary rules of state responsibility, that govern the breach
of these primary rules. The third consists of a regime of compulsory
adjudication over disputes pertaining to the breach of the relevant
environmental obligations. 12
little or nothing that courts can do to address overpopulation.
11 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UN, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE
2 (2018), available at http://www.fao.org/3/i9540en/I9540EN.pdf.
12 JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1-110 (2013).
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Primary rules establishing or creating an environmental commons may be
formulated or generated by a treaty or customary law. The violation of these
primary rules amount to international wrongs that give rise to the secondary
rules of state responsibility. However, the existence of primary rules cannot
invoke judicial protection, unless atreaty mandates compulsory adjudication
of disputes concerning the violation of these primary rules, or where parties
agree to judicial settlement. Consequently, judicial protection can only be
invoked where the wrongs caused by the alleged breach of these primary
rules are subject to adjudication by a court or tribunal.
If these three factors are present, courts could offer judicial protection of
the environmental commons in any of the seven areas described above. I will
deal with the protection of the oceanic commons through the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") 13 because this treaty
satisfies the three conditions of primary rules of obligation, secondary rules
of state responsibility,4 and a regime of compulsory judicial settlement. My
analysis will employ the lens of three important cases.
A. Oceanic Environmental Commons
According to the United Nations:
Oceans cover three quarters of the Earth's surface, contain 97 percent of the
Earth's water, and represent 99 percent of the living space on the planet by
volume. Over three billion people depend on marine and coastal biodiversity
for their livelihoods.
Oceans serve as the world's largest source of protein, with more than 3 billion
people depending on the oceans as their primary source of protein[.]. Marine
fisheries directly or indirectly employ over 200 million people.
13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. The convention concluded in 1982 and came into force in 1994.
U.N., DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & LAW OF THE SEA, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA (A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE) (1998), available at https://www.un.org/Depts
/los/convention agreements/convention historical-perspective .htm.
14 Int'l Law Comn'n, Rep. to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/200 1/Add. 1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on
State Responsibility].
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Coastal waters are deteriorating due to pollution and eutrophication. Without
concerted efforts, coastal eutrophication is expected to increase in 20 percent
of large marine ecosystems by 2050.15
The primary legal instrument governing the oceans is UNCLOS.'6
Politically, the global importance of oceans was recognized by Sustainable
Development Goal 14 that deals with the conservation and sustainable use of
the oceans.7
B. Cases Invoking the Environmental Commons
1. Nuclear Test Cases
The Nuclear Test Cases were instituted and decided prior to UNCLOS, or
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.8 In these cases both Australia and
New Zealand brought separate, but similar, actions against France in the
International Court of Justice ("I'"), complaining of France's imminent
atmospheric tests on the Moruroa Atoll in the South Pacific. 19 From 1967 to
1972 France had conducted atmospheric tests within its own territory, and
appeared about to begin another series of tests in 1973.20 Both Australia and
New Zealand made similar arguments as to why French nuclear testing
violated international law. One claim or cause of action was based on the
violation of national sovereignty. Australia argued that:
The deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of Australia and its
dispersion in Australia's airspace without Australia's consent:
(a) violates Australian sovereignty over its territory; [and]
(b) impairs Australia's independent right o determine what acts shall
take place within its territory and in particular whether Australia and its
people shall be exposed to radiation from artificial sources[.]21
15 Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans,
Seas and Marine Resources, U.N., https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 2019). See also MINDY SELMAN ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., EUTROPHICATION
AND HYPOXIA IN COASTAL AREAS: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
(2008), available at https://www.wri.org/publication/eutrophication-and-hypoxia-coastal-
areas.
16 CRAWFORD, supra note 12; UNCLOS, supra note 13.
17 Goal 14, supra note 15.
18 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457 (Dec. 20).
19 Austl. V. Fr., 1974 I.C.J., 16-18; N.Z. v. Fr., 1974 I.C.J., 16-19.
20 N.Z. v. Fr., 1974 I.C.J., 17.
21 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of
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The second cause of action is more relevant to our discussion because it
concerned the protection of the collective interests of the international
community, and what we may call the environmental commons. New
Zealand articulated this argument very clearly by claiming that France's
action violated "the rights of all members of the international community,
including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active
fall-out be conducted"22 and also violated "the rights of all members of the
international community, including New Zealand, to the preservation from
unjustified artificial radio-active contamination of the terrestrial, maritime
and aerial environment and, in particular, of the environment of the region in
which the tests are conducted[.] 
23
It is to be noted that both New Zealand and Australia effectively took the
position that the high seas were res communis, and that every state had an
interest in protecting the freedom of the seas even in the absence of a material
interest or injury in fact.24 In so doing they anticipated the concept of the
high seas as the common heritage of mankind as subsequently expressed in
Article 136 and explicated further by Articles 137 to 148 of UNCLOS
Furthermore, the two claims of Australia and New Zealand relating to state
responsibility could now be justified under Articles 42 and 48 of the Draft
Articles of State Responsibility. Article 42 of the Draft Articles of State
Responsibility deals with injury in fact,26 while Article 48 addresses the
environmental commons.27  A plain reading of Article 48 makes this
abundantly clear. According to Article 48:
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of
another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State,
and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a
whole.
28
Protection, Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 22 (June 22).
22 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 494, 36 (Dec, 20) (joint
dissenting opinion by Onyeama, J., Dillard, J., Jimdnez de Ardchaga, J., and Sir Humphrey
Waldock, J.).
23 Id.
24 See id. 7.
25 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at arts. 136 to 148.
26 Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 14, at art. 42.
27 Id. at art. 48.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
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The two petitioners requested interim measures, and the ICJ granted these
requests in 1973, stating that "no action of any kind [should be] taken which
might aggravate or extend the dispute.., and, in particular, the French
Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active
fall-out, 29 on the respective territories of Australia and New Zealand.
30
While the ICJ did not base its interim measures on the second cause of action
relating to the international community, they found that the petitioners had
established a prima facie case. It is reasonable to not dismember the "case"
but to treat it as the whole case which includes the second cause of action.
Moreover, the Joint Dissenting Opinion clearly stated that the court should
be open to consider actions brought to enforce the kind of obligations erga
omnes referred to in the Barcelona Traction case.31 Unfortunately, France
ignored the decision and actually conducted two more nuclear tests.32 The
actions of France flew in the face of Article 59 of the ICJ's governing statute
that clearly states that any decision rendered by the ICJ is binding on the
parties to the case.33 However, the ICJ appeared incapable of doing anything
about this flagrant violation of its decision.
2. South China Sea Arbitration
A recent decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") perhaps
offers the best doctrinal example of judicial protection of the environmental
commons.34 The PCA's jurisdiction is derived from UNCLOS-all State
parties to UNCLOS agree to compulsory dispute settlement procedures under
Part XV, Section 2 of the treaty.35 The arbitration revolved around whether
China's claim to sovereignty over much of the South China Sea based on its
nine-dash-line around the great wall of sand was compatible with
29 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of
Protection, Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 106 (June 22).
30 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of
Protection, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 49, 46-47 (May 14).
31 Austl. v. Fr., 1974 I.C.J., 103 (joint dissenting opinion by Onyeama, J., Dillard, J.,
Jimdnez de Ardchaga, J., and Sir Humphrey Waldock, J.) (citing Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 13, 32 (Feb.
5)).
32 LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY & MARIAH ZEBROWSKI LEACH, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 674 (5th ed. 2017) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW].
33 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59.
34 See In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
35 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at Part XV, § 2.
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UNCLOS.36 China objected to the PCA's jurisdiction on the basis that it had
submitted a declaration at the time it ratified UNCLOS, exempting disputes
over sea boundaries and land territory from compulsory arbitration.37 On this
ground, China did not participate in the arbitration.
The PCA held first, that they were not dealing with boundary delimitation,
and that the claims presented by the Philippines did not concern sea boundary
delimitation and were not, therefore, subject to the exception to the dispute
settlement provisions of UNCLOS.38 The PCA also emphasized that the
Philippines had not asked it to delimit any boundary.39  China's non-
participation did not deprive it of jurisdiction under Annex VII, Article 9 of
UNCLOS.4 ° It then went on to decide the case on the merits, and in doing so
further decided that any historic rights China previously had in the South
China Sea, insofar as they were incompatible with the Exclusive Economic
Zones ("EEZ") of other states, were relinquished when China ratified
UNCLOS.41 Therefore, Chinese navigation and fishing in the South China
Sea were simply exercises of high seas freedoms rather than of any historic
rights.4 2 The PCA further explained that the underlying rationale of
UNCLOS was to give resources in EEZs to coastal states.43
Correspondingly, states with only a presence on small features would not
have the same entitlements as coastal States.
44
The most important aspect of the case, relating to this discussion on
judicial protection of the global commons, is worth noting. This aspect of
the case concerned the PCA's holding that China's land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, and its failure to
prevent Chinese fishermen from harvesting endangered sea life, constituted
a breach of its obligations under Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS to
36 Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 7; see also China Building 'Great Wall of
Sand' in South China Sea, BBC (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
32126840.
37 Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 6, 13. China ratified UNCLOS on June 7,
1996. When doing so, it declared in writing, as it was permitted to do under Article 298 of
UNCLOS that it did not accept the compulsory judicial jurisdiction under Section 2 relating
to boundary delimitation and disputes concerning military activities. UNCLOS, supra note
13, at art. 298.
38 Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 155.
39 Id. 28.
40 Id. 12.
41 Id. 252, 261-63.
42 Id. 270.
43 Id. 519.
44 Id. 77 517-19.
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preserve and protect the marine environment.45 The Philippines had argued
that the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment is not
dependent on deciding which Party, if any, has sovereignty or sovereign
rights or jurisdiction over Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal or
Mischief Reef.46 What controlled instead, was the duty placed on China to
control the harmful fishing practices, the land creation, and the construction
activities which threaten the marine environment at those locations and
elsewhere in the South China Sea.47
The unanimous decision of the PCA on this question is categorical and
unequivocal. It held that the obligations in Part XII, dealing with the
protection and preservation of the marine environment, applies "to all States
with respect o the marine environment in all maritime areas, both inside the
national jurisdiction of States and beyond it. Accordingly, questions of
sovereignty are irrelevant to the application of Part XII of [UNCLOS]."48
The applicability of these duties "have no bearing upon, and are not in any
way dependent upon, which State is sovereign over features in the South
China Sea.",49  In effect they are obligations owed to the international
community as a whole. It further wrote:
This "general obligation" extends both to "protection" of the marine
environment from future damage and "preservation" in the sense of
maintaining or improving its present condition.
The content of the general obligation in Article 192 is further detailed in
the subsequent provisions of Part XII, including Article 194, as well as by
reference to specific obligations set out in other international agreements, as
envisaged in Article 237 of the Convention.
50
According to the PCA, "Articles 192 and 194 set forth obligations not only
in relation to activities directly taken by States and their organs, but also in
relation to ensuring activities within their jurisdiction and control do not
harm the marine environment.'" 51 It then examined Article 194(2), which
states: "States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by






50 Id. 77 941-42.
51 Id. 944.
52 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 194, 2.
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Fisheries Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, which had drawn on decisions of the ICJ in Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay and the Seabed Disputes Chamber advisory opinion, to conclude
"that the obligation to 'ensure' is an obligation of conduct.,53 It imposes an
obligation on "a flag State to ensure its fishing vessels not be involved in
activities which will undermine a flag State's responsibilities under
[UNCLOS] in respect of the conservation of living resources and the
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment."
54
The PCA then dealt with the argument that China had destroyed fragile
and critical ecosystems prohibited by Article 194(5) of UNCLOS that
protects and preserves rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.
55
It concluded that there was:
[N]o doubt from the scientific evidence before it that the marine environments
where the allegedly harmful activities took place in the present dispute
constitute "rare or fragile ecosystems." They are also the habitats of "depleted,
threatened or endangered species," including the giant clam, the hawksbill
turtle and certain species of coral and fish. 6
China's actions had, therefore, violated Article 194(5).
Furthermore, the PCA held that China also violated a cluster of other
obligations. One set of those obligations are found in Article 197 read with
Article 123.57 These Articles deal with cooperation, especially in dealing
with enclosed and semi enclosed seas like to South China Seas.58  They
"require[] States to cooperate on a global or regional basis, 'directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with [UNCLOS], for the protection and preservation
of the marine environment[.] '59 China had not done so.
53 Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 944 (citing Request for Advisory Opinion
submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr.
2, 2015, ITLOS Rep. 2015, 118-36; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
Judgment, 2010 J.C.J. Rep. 14 (Apr. 20); Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect o Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory




57 Id. 946; UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 123, 197.
58 Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 946.
51 Id. (quoting UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 197).
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Other obligations allegedly violated by China include those found in
Articles 204, 205, and 206.60 Article 204 requires states to "endeavour [sic],
as far as practicable, directly or through the competent international
organizations, to bserve, measure, evaluate and analyse [sic], by recognized
scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution on the marine
environment.",61 It also requires states to "keep under surveillance the effects
of any activities which they permit or in which they engage in order to
determine whether these activities are likely to pollute the marine
environment.,62 Article 205 requires states to publish reports of the results
from such monitoring to the competent international organizations, which
should make them available to all states.63 Finally, Article 206 relates to
environmental impact assessments.
64
What is evident from South China Sea Arbitration is that the obligations
contained in Part XII of UNCLOS satisfied the three preconditions for
invoking state responsibility. First, it created primary rules protecting and
preserving the marine nvironment as an international commons, that are
owed to the international community as a whole. Second, these rules could
give rise to state responsibility under Article 48 of the DraftArticles on State
Responsibility. Third, UNCLOS required compulsory judicial settlement of
alleged violations of its provisions. As we have noted this is found in Part
XV of UNCLOS.65
In the result, South China Sea Arbitration is perhaps the best example of
how international courts have sought to protect the global commons.
However, South China Sea Arbitration further illustrates the problem
encountered in the Nuclear Test cases, namely the inability of international
courts to enforce or implement their order in the face of resistance or rejection
by the offending state.
3. Seabed Disputes Chamber of The International Tribunal for The
Law Of The Sea, Responsibilities And Obligations Of States Sponsoring
Persons and Entities with Respect To Activities In The Area, Advisory
Opinion of February 1, 2011
The Seabed Disputes Chamber (the "Chamber") is a separate judicial body
within the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"). It is
entrusted, through its advisory and contentious jurisdiction, with the
60 See id 947-48.
61 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 204.
62 Id. at art. 204.
63 Id. at art. 205.
64 Id. at art. 206.
65 See id at Part XV.
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exclusive function of interpreting Part XI of UNCLOS dealing with the Area,
and the relevant annexes and regulations that are the legal basis for the
organization and management of activities in the Area. The Chamber's
advisory opinion, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring
Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities in the Area, concerned the
duties of various parties engaged in deep sea bed mining.6 6 The Chamber
characterized the nature of the environmental obligations relating to
compensation, writing:
Each State Party may also be entitled to claim compensation in light of the erga
omnes character of the obligations relating to preservation of the environment
of the high seas and in the Area. In support of this view, reference may be
made to article 48 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility[.] 67
The reference to obligations erga omnes, and Article 48 of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, relating to obligations owed to the international
community should be situated within the characterization of the Area as the
common heritage of mankind by Article 136 of UNCLOS. When these
provisions are read in conjunction, the contextualized area and environmental
commons can invoke judicial supervision.
IV. PROBLEMS CONFRONTING JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS UNDER RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY.
While states may invoke court intervention to protect the environmental
commons, based on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, they face a
number of legal and practical difficulties. These challenges traverse the
geopolitics of international relations, the nature of the international
adjudication, the actors causing harm to the environmental commons, the
existence and ambit of primary rules of obligation, the doctrine of state
responsibility, and the implementation of a court order.
First, the geopolitics of international relations and the international
adjudication. International law functions within a complex vortex of a global
community consisting of 193 sovereign independent states.68 International
law, is a body of law created by these states to promote interaction and govern
66 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities inthe Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion ofFeb. 1,2011, ITLOS Rep.
2011.
67 Responsibilities and Obligations of States, supra note 66, 189 (quoting Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, supra note 14, at art. 48).
68 For a list of the 193 states that make up the United Nations, see Member States, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/member-states/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
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problems that arise between themselves.69 International environmental law
("IEL"), a branch of international law, is situated and expressed primarily in
treaties, which consist of written agreements between two or more states
creating or re-stating legal rights and duties. Where states that have agreed
to and incorporated primary rules protecting the global commons in treaties,
it is open to them to seek the protection of these environmental commons.
It is a related geopolitical fact, however, that states aspire to have friendly
relations with other states, and comity does not favor adversarial litigation.
70
The foreign offices and chancelleries across the world, much prefer to settle
their differences by diplomatic means and not resort to litigation. Litigation
is expensive, distracting, time consuming, and may attenuate goodwill
among nations. Furthermore, where they decide to litigate, states usually do
so to vindicate their individual self-interest, not promote community
objectives. Accordingly, litigation is not ordinarily pursued in the absence
of self-promoting or self-serving circumstances. This may constrain judicial
protection because it may be difficult to find a champion of the
environmental commons, that undertakes costly litigation, based on altruism
not self-interest.
A second difficulty concerns the actors. International law is an interstate
system that only binds states. Consequently, non-state actors like
multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), or
private parties, do not directly fall under the jurisdiction of courts set up by
treaties that protect the global commons. Quite often, those most concerned
about damage to the commons are private persons or non-governmental
environmental organizations, not states. They claim to act as watchdogs over
the environment. These environmental watchdogs cannot directly bring an
action in an international tribunal based on the violation of a treaty. Instead,
NGOs will need to convince their national governments to espouse the cause
of the environmental commons and institute a case against the offending
state.
The Trail Smelter case, a well-known public international aw case dealing
with transboundary pollution, is illustrative of how state responsibility
works.71 In Trail Smelter, sulfur dioxide fumes from a Canadian smelter
were causing damage in the state of Washington.72 Farmers who suffered
69 In this Article, "international law" refers to public international law created by states,
and not to transnational laws involving non-state players like corporations or non-
governmental organizations.
70 See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1991)
(using comity, an elusive and canonically undefined concept, as one expressing goodwill and
respect towards other nations).
71 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938).
72 Id. at 1907, 1912, 1917.
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damage were prevented from bringing an action in U.S. courts because they
would have encountered jurisdictional difficulties. The first of these
jurisdictional problems arose from the fact that the company owning the
smelters had its place of business and was registered in Canada.73 A second
jurisdictional problem arose from the locus delicti, or the fact that the act that
initiated the damage, and therefore the tort, occurred in Canada.
Even if the plaintiffs had been able to overcome this difficulty and
persuade a U.S. court to assume jurisdiction on the basis that the harm
inflicted or damage suffered was in the U.S., they still faced other difficulties.
Another problem was the proper law to be applied by the court. Should it be
Canadian or U.S. law? If the applicable law were Canadian, to what extent
did Canadian law permit recovery of damages in cases where the harm
suffered was in a jurisdiction different from that in which it originated? The
doctrine of forum non conveniens, or the appropriate forum for an action,
raised another question. Were the U.S. courts an appropriate forum for
deciding a case such as this?
These were among the reasons for the U.S. to espouse and advocate the
claims of the Washington farmers and negotiate a treaty with Canada:
Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operations of Smelter
at Trail, B.C. (1935) ("Convention for Settlement").74 In this treaty, Canada
accepted state responsibility for provable damage caused by the Trail
smelter.7 5 An arbitral tribunal was created under that reaty to find a solution
that was just to all parties.76 The arbitral tribunal concluded that the
Dominion of Canada was responsible in international law for the conduct of
the Trail Smelter, apart from the undertakings in the Convention for
Settlement. It held, therefore, that it was the duty of the Government of the
Dominion of Canada to ensure that its conduct conform with the obligation
of the Dominion under international law, not to allow its territory to be used
in a manner that caused transboundary damage to another state.77 Trail
Smelter demonstrates the working of an inter-state or international system of
law. The injured Washington farmers obtained relief only because they
persuaded their state, the United States, to espouse and advocate their claims
against Canada, the state where the Trail Smelter was located. Moreover,
they able to appear before the tribunal, and seek damages, only because the
treaty allowed them to do so.
73 Id. at 1918.
74 Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operations of Smelter at Trail,
B.C., U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1935, 3 R.I.A.A. 1907.
75 Id. at art. 1.
76 Id. at art. 2.
77 See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1934-37.
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The third and fourth impediments deal with those created by primary rules
of obligation, and secondary rules of state responsibility. When one nation
brings another to court, it relies on state responsibility, a form of international
tort law. The International Law Commission ("ILC"), codified the law
dealing with state responsibility in 1955. The first of their three volumes of
work, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility was finalized in 2001,78 and
"it laid the conceptual foundations and provided an authoritative re-statement
of state responsibility. '79 The authority of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility was confirmed by the ICJ in Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The ICJ found
that Articles 4 and 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility were a
codification of customary international law.81
The foundational principle of state responsibility, as of tort law, is the
concept of an internationally "wrongful" act.82 A state commits an
internationally wrongful act when it violates or acts in breach of an existing
international obligation, found in treaty or customary law. As such, an act's
classification as "wrongful" depends not on its being morally unacceptable
per se, but instead on the wrongfulness of breaching international law. In
theory, all obligations, whether general or specific, contained in treaties as
well as in customary law, have the potential to give rise to state responsibility.
According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, "[e]very
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility
of that State,83 and "[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when
conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State
under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State.'"84
What this entails is that there must be pre-existing primary rules of law
establishing that it is wrong to damage the environmental commons, and next
there is a need to attribute the conduct damaging the environment to a state.
78 See generally Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 14. "This final draft
was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, which commended it on numerous occasions,
and decided in 2007 to consider the question of a convention on the basis of the [Draft]
Articles[.]" Lakshman Guruswamy, State Responsibility in Promoting Environmental
Corporate Accountability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 209, 211 n.5 (2010). This has not
happened yet.
79 Guruswamy, supra note 78, at 211.
80 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide), Merits, 2007 J.C.J. 43
(Feb. 26).
81 Id. at 283-84, 287.
82 See generally Guruswamy, supra note 78, at 210-12.
83 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 14, at art. 1.
84 Id. at art. 2.
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Attribution may present problems. Entities responsible for damaging the
global commons by pollution or resource extraction almost invariably are
non-state entities. They include multinational corporations or private actors
as distinct from states themselves or agencies belonging to the state. Take
the hypothetical case of a private corporation, registered in state A causing
damage to the oceanic environmental commons, shared by states A, B, and
C, by harvesting deep sea bed nodules.5 The actions of such NGOs must be
attributable to a state under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. As a
private corporation, their conduct is not that of an organ of the state under
Article 4, or conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of
governmental authority under Article 5.
It is arguable, however, that their actions are directed and controlled, and
therefore attributable to the state under Article 8:
Proving attribution under Article 8 is very difficult because it involves proving
a direct agency relationship. It must also be shown that the state gave specific
directions, or exercised explicit control over a corporation's actions. In their
commentaries to the [DraftArticles on State Responsibility], the ILC concluded
that, as a general rule, the conduct of private persons and corporations is not
attributable to the State under public international law. In dealing with Article
8, the ILC considered the example of a State-owned and controlled enterprise.
They concluded that prima facie the conduct of even such an enterprise is not
attributable to the State. Given the opinion of the ILC, it is going to be
substantially more difficult to attribute the conduct of a private corporation to
a state. In sum, this means that the actions of a private corporation can only be
attributed to a state under Article 8 in very exceptional circumstances. Such
circumstances should demonstrate explicit control and direction exercised by
the State over the impugned actions of [a corporation].
8 6
The ICJ confirmed this strict interpretation of Article 8 in the Bosnia case:
In that case, Serbia and Montenegro alleged that the former Yugoslavia (now
Bosnia and Hertzgovania) was responsible for committing genocide. The [ICJ]
discussed the question of whether, although not organs of Serbia in general, the
perpetrators were acting under Serbian "direction and control" "in carying out
the conduct" under Article 8. The decision of the ICJ followed the reasoning
85 Polymetallic nodules, also called manganese nodules, are rock concretions on the sea
bottom formed of concentric layers of iron and manganese hydroxides around a core. As
nodules can be found in vast quantities, and contain valuable metals, deposits have been
identified as having economic interest. See generally JOHN MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES
OF THE SEA (1965).
86 See Guruswamy, supra note 78, at 213-14.
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and "effective control" test it used in the earlier case of Military and
Paramilitary Activities.87
Applying the "effective control" test from the Nicaragua case in the
Bosnia case, the ICJ concluded that:
[T]he state will be responsible for non-state actors to the extent that "they acted
in accordance with that state's instructions or under its effective control." This
responsibility requires direction or control by Serbia over specific, identifiable
events of the genocide. General control over the direction of operations is
inadequate; there must have been specific control over the international
wrongful act. The [ICJ] explained that, "it must however be shown that this
'effective control' was exercised, or that the State's instructions were given, in
respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally
in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons
having committed the violations."
88
In South China Sea Arbitration, we have seen how the PCA held China
responsible for violations of various provisions of UNCLOS dealing with the
pollution and protection of the marine environment. The question of
attribution was not specifically addressed in this case apparently because
China did not contest that their island-building and fishing projects in the
South China Sea were attributable to China. Moreover, China's statements
do not identify other actors responsible for the island-building or fishing
projects.89 In the course of the dispute, as the order of PCA points out,
China issued several statements affirming the Chinese government's purpose
for building artificial islands.90 A spokesperson for China's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs stated that China is, in fact, building artificial islands in the
Spratly Islands area to "meet various civilian demands and better perform
China's international obligations and responsibilities[.]"91  Furthermore,
Chinese spokespersons claimed that the Chinese government has taken into
account ecological preservation and fishery management in conducting its
construction project.92  The Chinese government also claimed to have
enacted ecological measures pursuant to its international obligations. In the
result, it may have emerged that attribution was conceded by China, and that
the PCA did not need to address this aspect of state responsibility.
87 Guruswamy, supra note 78, at 213-14 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 J.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27)).
88 Id. at 214-15.
89 In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award,
920 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
90 Id. 77 919-20.
91 Id. 7 919.
92 Id. 77 917, 920.
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It is surprising, however, that attribution, which is an essential and
indispensable element of the rules of state responsibility, was not specifically
raised, analyzed or addressed by the PCA. It was incumbent on the PCA to
do so even if they considered that Articles 193 and 194 of UNCLOS
embodied obligations of conduct that obviated the need for attribution. It
was necessary for the PCA to have articulated why their interpretation of
those articles dispensed with the need for attribution. The clear need to
address attribution was further underlined by the fact that China neither
accepted nor participated in the proceedings, and was not represented at the
hearings.93 In these circumstances the PCA acknowledged that the situation
of a non-participating party imposes a special responsibility on it.94 Referring
to Article 9 of Annex 7 of UNCLOS, the PCA stressed the importance, before
making its award, to satisfy itself "not only that it has jurisdiction over the
dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law. 95
Given this self-admonition it behooved the PCA to have raised the crucial
issue of attribution, even if the facts overwhelmingly proved that he illegal
actions were attributable to China, rendering them res ipsa loquitur,96 or that
China had conceded attribution, or that the primary rules did not require
attribution. Whatever the PCA's basis for dispensing with attribution, the
PCA should have referenced the facts and articulated its reasons for so doing.
The absence of any treatment of attribution creates a lacuna in the award. As
we have seen, attribution must be shown before state responsibility can be
proved, and the South China Sea Arbitration cannot be interpreted as
dispensing with attribution. Moreover, the seeming admission made by
China in South China Sea Arbitration may not be forthcoming in other cases
involving the environmental commons, and attribution will continue to
present challenges when dealing with the actions of non-state actors.
Fifth, causation could be another obstacle. Typically, more than one state
may be responsible for causing damage to the environmental commons by
way of pollution or extraction of natural resources. Consider the example of
damage to coral reefs within an environmental commons, caused by pollution
93 Id. 6, 12-13.
94 Id. 12.
95 Id.
96 Res ipsa loquitor means "the thing speaks for itself." Res Ipsa Loquitor, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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from numerous nations discharging pesticides,97 dioxins,98 and various
petrochemicals.99 Because of the nature of the substances involved, the harm
caused to coral reefs due to exposure, typically are not discovered until long
after the exposure occurred. It becomes very difficult to demonstrate which
state or states are responsible for the resulting damage.
Typically, hazardous waste disposal by states involves many participants,
who have been categorized as generators, transporters, and disposal site
operators.100 To complicate the identification issue further, the substances
disposed of in the environmental commons may have come from several
different generators in different countries, analogous to a waste dump site in
the United States.'0' Records by generators, transporters and site owners are
17 Most pesticides are produced by the petrochemical industry, but their importance as a
source of pollution arising from individual and agricultural use calls for separate treatment.
There are many different types of pesticide products in use, including: insecticides (insects),
herbicides (plants), fungicides (molds and mildew), rodenticides (rats and mice), acaricides
(mites and ticks), bactericides (bacteria), avicides (birds), and nematicides (roundworms).
According to the most recent Environmental Protection Agency CEPA") report, nearly 6
billion pounds of pesticides were used worldwide in 2011 and 2012. DONALD ATWOOD &
CLAIRE PAISLEY-JONES, EPA, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 2008-2012 MARKET
ESTIMATES 9 (2017), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01
/documents/pesticides -industry -sale s-usage-2016 0.pdf.
98 Dioxin can refer to any of a number of chlorinated hydrocarbon compounds that are
produced as toxic side products in a range of industrial processes. See generally Dioxins and
Their Effects on Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.who.int
/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dioxins-and-their-effects-on-human-health. T ese compounds
are highly carcinogenic, persist for long periods in the environment, and can accumulate up
the food chain. Id.
99 We use and find petrochemicals in goods as varied as food, medicine, cosmetics,
lumber, household appliances, fuels, plastics, papers, and innumerable other manufactured
products. Petrochemicals are divided into two groups: organic and inorganic. Organic
compounds are based on carbon atoms usually in combination with hydrogen, and the better
known include ethylene, methylene chloride, formaldehyde, benzene,
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Inorganic
compounds are not based on carbon, and examples of such substances include sulfuric acid,
aluminum, and chromium. Petrochemical products enter the environment in a number of
ways. The principal among these are intentional use as in the case of pesticides, incidental
and operational releases of liquid discharges and gaseous emissions during their
manufacturing process, accidental spills, and waste disposal. INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 32, at 361.
100 See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949, 950 n.5 (1980) (noting that "[i]n many cases, the party
responsible for the improper disposal either cannot be identified or is insolvent"); see
generally Stephen M. Soble, Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of
Toxic Substance Pollution: A MIodelAct, 14 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 683 (1977).
101 William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom
Remedy, 9 HOFSTRAL. REv. 859, 896-97(1981).
2019 / THE USE OF CO URTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMONS 297
rarely kept.10 2 Consequently, it may not be possible to isolate a culpable state
or states responsible for the damage to the coral reefs. 1
03
Moreover, ascertaining the particular substance that caused the injury is
very difficult and often impossible for a number of reasons. First, substances
that escaped into the air or water may have combined with other substances
forming a new compound.10 4 Second, a substance may manifest itself in
different ways depending upon the characteristics of the ecosystem it
damages. Third, the latency period between exposure and injury may also
vary with each individual. 10 5 As a result, identifying any responsible state
party, much less identifying all responsible parties, can be a daunting task.
A final challenge confronting judicial intervention to protect the
environmental commons relates to enforcement of the judicial order. As we
have seen from the Nuclear Test cases and South China Sea Arbitration, the
orders of the ICJ and the PCA were not enforced. The absence of an
executive agency or machinery for enforcement of the orders and decisions
of international tribunal raises important questions as to the utility and/or
effectiveness of adjudication to protect the global commons.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The South China Sea Arbitration offers the strongest evidence of how
primary rules of law such as those found in Part XII of UNCLOS can be used
to protect environmental commons.10 6 Part VII of the South China Sea
Arbitration, dealing with environmental damage in the South China sea, is
worthy of, and deserves, much greater consideration than the scant attention
given to it by scholars and publicists. The PCA held that the rules contained
in Articles 193, 194 and other provisions of UNCLOS establish primary rules
protecting the environmental commons that gives rise to secondary rules of
state responsibility.0 7 Admittedly, the award was flawed to the extent that
attribution was not articulated or explicitly addressed, but that deficiency is
severable from the rest of the award. It is clear that the rest of the award
holding that some of the primary rules embodied in Part XII of UNCLOS
protected the global commons, regardless of state jurisdiction, is of singular
importance.
102 Id. at 891 n.131.
103 Id. at 897.
104 See Ginsburg & Weiss, supra note 101, at 922; Soble, supra note 100, at 686, 699.
105 See Ginsburg & Weiss, supra note 101, at 920-23; Soble, supra note 100, at 686.
106 See generally In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-
19, Award, 906-11 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
107 See id. 940.
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With regard to the secondary rules of state responsibility, the South China
Sea Arbitration did not consider attribution. This is an omission even though
China appeared to concede attribution by admitting it specifically directed
the fishing and building operations in issue. Where, as in most cases,
attribution is not conceded, it remains to be proved, and as we have noted,
may present formidable difficulties. Environmental harm to the commons,
in the great majority of cases, is caused by corporations or private entities not
organs of the state. Article 8 of the Draft Rules of State Responsibility, as
applied and interpreted by the case law, has been narrowly construed and
appears to preclude attribution to private corporations. Given that the ILC
commentaries on Article 8 affirmed the narrow scope of the article,08 the
ILC should revisit this subject and rewrite Article 8 or expand the meaning
of it in their commentaries to include the actions of private corporations.
The inability to enforce international judicial decisions remains a
fundamental problem and will require collective measures by the entire
community of nations. Based on the materials offered in this article, it may
be contended that the difficulty only arises in enforcing judicial remedies
against powerful countries as distinguished from smaller less developed
countries. In the cases cited, France in the Nuclear Test cases and China in
the South China Sea Arbitration repudiated judicial decisions that they were
legally obligated to accept and implement. This ought not to be the case, and
justice irrefutably requires rich and powerful nations to comply with the law.
The primary difficulty in enforcing international judicial decisions is that
there is no agency empowered to do so. It becomes necessary, therefore, to
search for ways of inducing compliance.
It may be possible to vest the UN Security Council ("SC") with powers to
enforce judicial decisions but this is impracticable for at least two reasons.
First, it will require amendments to the UN Charter and this does not appear
politically feasible. Second, even if the UN Charter were amended, allowing
it to take measures to enforce international decisions under selected globally
accepted treaties including UNCLOS, any decision to enforce the judgments
in the Nuclear Test cases and South China Sea Arbitration would have been
vetoed, because both France and China are permanent members of the SC,
and along with the other members (the United Kingdom, United States, and
Russia) can exercise veto power in the SC.
A more feasible and practical measure might take the form of a UN
General Assembly Resolution demanding that the order in the South China
Sea Arbitration be accepted and complied with by China. This will bring
public pressure on China. While shaming China in the UN may not persuade
it to honor the Philippines decision, the naming, shaming, and embarrassment
108 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 14.
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triggered by GA Resolutions may deter other nations from following the
same path. The obvious state to propose such a GA Resolution is the United
States. Unfortunately, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, and did
not participate in the South China Sea Arbitration. It will lack credibility in
moving for the enforcement of awards under UNCLOS. It is past time that
the United States ratified UNCLOS. 0 9
109 On June 14, 2012, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a "24 Star"
hearing that featured six four-star generals and admirals representing every branch of the U.S.
Armed Forces. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, "24 Star"
Military Witnesses Voice Strong Support for Law of the Sea Treaty (June 14, 2012), available
at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/24-star-military-witnesses-voice-strong
-support-for-law-of-the-sea-treaty. All of the witnesses-which included the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, and Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command-testified in favor of ratifying
UNCLOS. Id.
